Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2015

The Anti-Innovators: How Special Interests Undermine
Entrepreneurship
James Bessen

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Science and Technology Law Commons

DATE DOWNLOADED: Thu Oct 13 18:57:28 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
James Bessen, The Anti-Innovators: How Special Interests Undermine Entrepreneurship,
94 FOREIGN AFF. 55 (2015).
ALWD 7th ed.
James Bessen, The Anti-Innovators: How Special Interests Undermine Entrepreneurship,
94 Foreign Aff. 55 (2015).
APA 7th ed.
Bessen, J. (2015). The anti-innovators: how special interests undermine
entrepreneurship. Foreign Affairs, 94(1), 55-60.
Chicago 17th ed.
James Bessen, "The Anti-Innovators: How Special Interests Undermine
Entrepreneurship," Foreign Affairs 94, no. 1 (January/February 2015): 55-60
McGill Guide 9th ed.
James Bessen, "The Anti-Innovators: How Special Interests Undermine Entrepreneurship"
(2015) 94:1 Foreign Aff 55.
AGLC 4th ed.
James Bessen, 'The Anti-Innovators: How Special Interests Undermine Entrepreneurship'
(2015) 94(1) Foreign Affairs 55
MLA 9th ed.
Bessen, James. "The Anti-Innovators: How Special Interests Undermine
Entrepreneurship." Foreign Affairs, vol. 94, no. 1, January/February 2015, pp. 55-60.
HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
James Bessen, 'The Anti-Innovators: How Special Interests Undermine Entrepreneurship'
(2015) 94 Foreign Aff 55
Provided by:
Fineman & Pappas Law Libraries
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

The AntiInnovators
How Special Interests

Undermine Entrepreneurship
James Bessen

Sor

much of the last century, the

United States led the world in
technological innovation-a
position it owed in part to well-designed
procurement programs at the Defense

Department and NASA. During the 1940s,
for example, the Pentagon funded the
construction of the first general-purpose
computer, designed initially to calculate
artillery-firing tables for the U.S. Army.
Two decades later, it developed the data
communications network known as the
ARPANET,

a precursor to the Internet. Yet

not since the 1980s have government
contracts helped generate any major new
technologies, despite large increases in
funding for defense-related R & D. One
major culprit was a shift to procurement
efforts that benefit traditional defense
contractors while shutting out start-ups.
Bad procurement policy is just one
reason the United States has begun to
lose its technological edge. Indeed, the
multibillion-dollar valuations in Silicon
Valley have obscured underlying problems
in the way the United States develops
and adopts technology. An increase in
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patent litigation, for example, has reduced
venture capital financing and R & D
investment for small firms, and strict
employment regulations have strengthened large employers and prevented the
spread of knowledge and skills across the
industry. Although the United States
remains innovative, government policies
have, across the board, increasingly favored
powerful interest groups at the expense
of promising young start-ups, stifling
technological innovation.
The root of the problem is the corrosive influence of money in politics. As
more intense lobbying and ever-greater
campaign contributions become the norm,
special interests are more able to sway
public officials. Indeed, these interests
have overpowered start-ups across the
government-at the Pentagon, in the
courts, and in various state legislatures.
A STRICT SEPARATION
U.S. government procurement has
spurred technological innovation since
the early nineteenth century, when the
U.S. War Department sought to develop
the high-precision machines needed
to make weapons from interchangeable
parts. Over the next two centuries, government programs cultivated a corps
of skilled engineers, technicians, and
software developers fluent in cuttingedge technologies, who would later adapt
them for general use in the private sector.
U.S. procurement programs worked
so well in part because the Pentagon
gave its business to a diverse group of
private firms, including start-ups and
university spinoffs such as Bolt, Beranek
and Newman (now BBN Technologies), one
of the companies that helped develop the
Internet. It also required contractors to
share their technologies with universities
January/February2015

55

James Bessen

and other private firms, encouraging
further innovation outside the government. By contrast, France and the United
Kingdom often used government contracts to promote national telephone and
computer companies, and the United
Kingdom and the Soviet Union limited
the interaction between government
researchers and their civilian counterparts, cutting off the private sector from
high-tech advancements. The Pentagon
also encouraged contractors to adopt
open technical standards-such as the
set of protocols, established in 1982, that
specified how data should be packaged
and transmitted on the Internet-which
allowed knowledge to spread quickly
and easily.
In the past few decades, however,
procurement has strayed from this
successful formula. Instead of awarding
contracts to start-ups and spinoffs, the
Pentagon has favored traditional defense
contractors. The Defense Department
tasks these contractors with meeting
the military's narrow needs and too
often prohibits them from sharing their
work with universities or other companies. An example from the past reveals
how problematic such policies can be.
In 1977, when the Pentagon sought to
create high-speed semiconductor chips,
Congress prohibited the contractors hired
from sharing their research. University
researchers were effectively excluded from
the program, and chipmakers were forced
to separate their defense work from their
commercial operations. Unlike the government procurement programs in the 1950s
and 1960s, which spawned many start-ups,
this billion-dollar program did little to
commercialize new technology.
The more recent reliance on defense
contractors reached an apex under Donald
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Rumsfeld's second term as secretary of
defense, from 2001 to 2006, when the
Pentagon restricted bidding to major
contractors, slashed funding to university
researchers, restricted the participation
of noncitizens in its programs, and classified most of the technology it produced.
The Pentagon has relaxed some of its
regulations since then-one recent
cyberwarfare research program sought
out computer hackers-but the larger
trend persists.
The reason for the shift is simple:
large defense contractors have the money
and influence to secure lucrative government contracts. Although procurement
has been the province of lobbyists since
President Dwight Eisenhower's 1961
warning about the "military-industrial
complex," the pure quantity of cash has
skyrocketed. Since 1990, the defense
industry has contributed more than
$200 million to political campaigns,
and in 2012 alone, it spent roughly
$132 million on more than 900 lobbyists.
Congress has its own interests, too.
The defense R & D budget regularly
includes pet projects for select congressional districts, most of which benefit
large contractors, not universities and
new firms.
OVERLY LITIGIOUS
Start-ups suffer not only from the
Pentagon's policies but also from the
actions of the courts. The proliferation
of patent litigation, in particular, has
become a serious problem for small
software firms, many of which make
easy targets for aggressive lawyers. Such
lawsuits are a relatively new phenomenon in the U.S. software industry,
which grew up patent free. In 1972,
the Supreme Court ruled that most
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A series of tubes: programminga US. Army computer in Philadelphia,1946
software could not be patented, reasoning
that unlike mechanical devices, abstract
software algorithms are difficult to tie
to a specific inventive concept. A decade
later, however, after persistent lobbying
by patent lawyers, Congress created the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
a new body designed to hear all appeals in
patent cases. Such specialization is extremely rare, for good reason: it promotes
boosterism. The new court, constantly
seeking to expand its role, began sidestepping the Supreme Court in the 1990s,
extending patent law to cover software.
It also loosened its restrictions on vaguesounding patents, such as those for
"information-manufacturing machines."
The number of patents and lawsuits
has surged as a result. A 2013 study by
the Government Accountability Office
found that the number of defendants
in patent lawsuits more than doubled

between 2007 and 2011; software patents
accounted for 89 percent of the increase.
Many of these lawsuits are the work
of "patent trolls"-companies that
exist solely to buy and litigate patents.
Patent trolls are particularly drawn to
software patents, which are often vague
enough to be widely applicable. In the
early 1980s, for example, one inventor
developed a kiosk for retail stores that
could produce music tapes from digital
downloads, filing a patent for an
"information-manufacturing machine" at
"a point of sale location." A patent troll
named E-Data later acquired the patent
and interpreted it to cover all sorts of
digital e-commerce, making millions of
dollars from suits against more than 100
companies. Lodsys, another patent troll,
bought an equally vague patent from 1992,
which covered "methods and systems
for gathering information from units of
January/February2015
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a commodity across a network." It has
now threatened to sue hundreds of
smartphone application developers for
infringement. As long as the courts
remain receptive to their suits, patent
trolls appear to be here to stay. And
their suits are expensive. In 2011, the
roughly 5,000 firms named as defendants in patent lawsuits paid more
than $29 billion out of pocket.
In the early years of this century,
software companies began pushing
Congress to reform patent law, and in
2011, it passed the America Invents Act.
More than 1,000 lobbyists worked on
the bill, including ten former members
of Congress, 280 former congressional
staffers, and more than 50 former government officials. In the end, the software lobby was simply overpowered
by patent lawyers and pharmaceutical
companies, both of which benefit from
the status quo in patent law-and are
bigtime political donors. The new law
did little to deter patent trolls or to
discourage the vague software patents
that allow trolls to abuse the system. In
fact, the law granted relief to only one
industry: finance. Thanks to pressure
from politically powerful Wall Street
executives, the law included a special
provision allowing financial firms to
challenge patents covering their services and products.
In December 2013, another bill
designed to weaken patent trolls passed
the House of Representatives, but pharmaceutical companies and trial lawyers
once again blocked reform. This past
May, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid
prevented the bill from coming to the
Senate floor for a vote. As long as reform
stalls, software entrepreneurs will continue to suffer. President Barack Obama
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acknowledged as much in October, at
a town hall meeting with technology
entrepreneurs in California, where he
cited concerns about "folks filing phony
patents, and costing some of our best
innovators tons of money in court, or
even if they don't go to court, having
to pay them off just because they're
making a bogus claim."
In much the same way, copyright
law also punishes innovators. For
much of the last century, copyright law
was flexible enough to accommodate
new technology-whether it was the
player piano, the phonograph, the
radio, the jukebox, the videotape
player, or cable television. Sometimes
the companies behind the new technologies had to pay licensing fees,
but often they were initially exempt
from copyright restrictions. Congress
waited to intervene until new technologies were established enough to
work out a fair compromise. Now,
however, powerful content providers
lobby Congress to ensure that new
distribution channels are taxed or
restricted while still in their infancy.
In 1988, for example, lobbyists for
network broadcasters and cable television companies convinced Congress
to restrict the market for emerging
satellite television providers, requiring
them to pay hefty licensing fees to
transmit to subscribers. A decade
later, lobbyists for broadcast radio
pushed for the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, which forced Internet
radio companies to pay larger royalties
than those paid by traditional stations.
Rather than accommodating new
technologies, in other words, copyright
law has been used to resist them.
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CONSTRAINING COMPETITION
Yet another threat to start-ups comes
from state legislatures, in the form of
increasingly cumbersome employment
regulations. Historically, technical workers such as mechanics and engineers
moved freely from job to job, spreading
new technologies across the industry.
Today, however, a variety of regulations
limit that mobility. Some states-Florida
and Massachusetts, for instance-have
made it easy for employers to enforce
noncompete agreements, which prohibit
employees from leaving one company to
join or start another in the same industry.
According to research conducted by the
law firm Beck Reed Riden, the number
of published U.S. court decisions

involving noncompete agreements rose
61 percent from 2002 to 2012, to 760
cases. This is bad news for innovation,
since such agreements make it difficult
for start-ups to recruit employees away
from established companies.
Consider the difference between
California, whose courts generally do not
enforce these agreements, and Massachusetts, whose do. Silicon Valley has become
a breeding ground for new technology
firms and new technologies, whereas
Massachusetts' Route 128 has fallen
behind. It is telling that the Facebook
co-founder Mark Zuckerberg moved his
company from Cambridge to Palo Alto
as it took off. This past summer, state
lawmakers in Massachusetts considered
January/February2015
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a ban on noncompete agreements, but
powerful business lobbying groups
fought hard against it, arguing that
the agreements keep employees from
stealing trade secrets and proprietary
information.
Interest groups are also lobbying
state legislatures to enforce strict
requirements for certification to work
in certain fields, another barrier to
innovation. In the past few decades,
occupational licensing has grown rapidly. In the 1950s, only 70 professions
had licensing requirements; by 2008,
more than 800 did. Political scientists
have tied this surge to aggressive lobbying by professional associations. In
1995 alone, 850 licensure bills related
to health professions were introduced
in state legislatures, and more than
300 became law. But excessive licensing
can be overly restrictive. In many states,
for example, licensing regulations prevent nurse practitioners and dental
hygienists from performing new preventive health procedures-such as
applying protective varnishes and
sealants to teeth-by restricting the
carrying out of these procedures to
doctors and dentists. Similar restrictions
limit the adoption of new telemedicine
and teledentistry technologies, which
use videoconferencing and data
transfer through smartphones and the
Internet to connect doctors and dentists to patients in rural areas. In
Alaska, for example, dental therapists
travel to remote Native Alaskan villages
to treat patients, often performing
procedures with the help of dentists
who consult remotely. In other states,
however, occupational regulations limit
the procedures dental therapists and
hygienists can perform outside of a
60
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traditional dentist's office, restricting
the use of these technologies and
reducing incentives to innovate further.
LOBBYING FOR THE FUTURE
Politics is about balancing competing
interests. Opposing factions battle one
another but ultimately compromise,
each getting something it wants. In
recent decades, however, start-ups
have consistently lost out. Whereas
established interests have the money
and lobbying power to buy political
influence, newer firms offer only the
promise of future profits. As Jim
Cooper, a Democratic congressman
from Tennessee, has framed the problem, "The future has no lobbyists."
Balance will be difficult to restore,
given that money will likely remain a
fixture of the U.S. political system.
The cost of running for Congress has
increased by more than 500 percent
since 1984, and spending by registered
Washington lobbyists has soared, more
than doubling between 1998 and 2008.
Efforts to curtail lobbying have largely
failed, with the Supreme Court restricting legislation intended to rein in campaign spending. But if technology
start-ups continue to suffer, the United
States may lose what has been the very
secret to its success.0

